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IV 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DANNY BRENT CRISCOLA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
11092 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant brings error to this court from a 
conviction at jury trial of the crimes of burglary in the 
second degree and grand larceny in violation of Utah 
statutes, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with burglary in the 
second degree and grand larceny on April 20, 1967. 
1 
A jury trial resulted in a conviction for the crimes as 
charged. Judge Bryant H. Croft, Third Judicial Dis-
trict, State of Utah, pronounced judgment on June 
30, 1967. A~ a result, appellant was sentenced to con-
finement at the Utah State Prison for the above meu-
tioned crimes on July 5, 1967. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment be 
affirmed and the case remitted to the Third Judicial 
District. 
STATEI\-IENT OF FACTS 
For the purpose of Respondent's arguments pre-
sented herein, the statement of facts presented in ap-
pellant's brief, as supplemented by argument m re-
spondent's brief is deemed sufficient. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT HAS WAIVED HIS 
RIGHT TO RAISE A SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
ISSUE THROUGH HIS FAILURE TO OB-
JECT TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE. 
The appellant as Points I and III of his brief, 
raises the issue of an illegal search and seizure of prop-
2 
erty from the control of the appellant. The gravaman 
of this claim being that certain items were seized from 
him by a search of his automobile in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
In his brief, the appellant submits that the failure 
to object cannot preclude consideration of the issue 
of the legality of the search and seizure, and would 
urge this court that the failure to object to the 
admission of the tainted evidence did not constitute 
an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right at trial" and therefore should be heard on 
the matter before this court. (Brief of appellant pp. 
25, 26). 
Disregarding whatever merit might be found in 
appellant's Fourth Amendment arguments, it remains 
clear and well established that timely objection to evi-
dence seized in contravention of Constitutional prohi-
bitions must be made to the trial court. Admittedly, 
at trial, counsel for appellant raised the nebulous objec-
tions to the admission of the crowbar and the sledge-
hammer on the grounds that possession of the appellant 
was not shown and that if shown was too remote in 
time to be of probative value. 
Of special inerest is the fact, clearly established 
in the record, that no objection was made to the court 
on the grounds now urged, nor were procedures under-
taken to suppress the admission of this evidence prior 
to the trial on the merits. 
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Ordinarily grounds of defense or oppos1t10n not 
asserted and relied on in the trial court will not be cou-
sidered or given weight on review. Wood v. State, 4 
Okla. 436, 112 Pac. 11 (1910). l·i'urther if appel-
lant intended to rely on constitutional objections to 
the procedures and events of trial it is incumbent 
upon him to assert them to the trial court. Alpha Cor-
poration v. Multnoma (}ountry, 182 Ore. 671, 189 
P2d. 988 (1948); Unemployment Com. Dept. v. Hunt, 
17 Wash. 2d 228, 135 P.2d 89 (1943). Failure to so 
do will not preserve the question of error as to the 
admissibility of the evidence, People v. Pickett, 339 
Mich. 294, 63 NW 2d 681, 45 A.L.R. 2d 1341 (1954) 
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 937, 75 S.Ct. 781, 99 L.ed. 1266 
( 1955) ; Coppinger v. Broderick, 37 Ariz. 473, 295 
Pac. 780, 81 A.L.R. 419 (1931), and waive any ob-
jection to the introduction of the evidence. Byers v. 
United States, 273 U.S. 28, 47 S. Ct. 248, 71 L.e<l. 
520 ( 1926) ; State v. Bailey, 23 Conn. Supp. 405, 
184, A.2d 61 ( 1962); State v. Pokini, 45 Hawaii 295, 
367 P.2d 499 89 A.L.R. 2d 1421 (1961); State v. 
Davi<lson, 248 La. 161, 177 So. 2d 273 (1967); Martin 
v. State, 203 Md. 66, 98 A.2d 8 (1953); State v. Wills, 
91 W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261, 24 A.L.R. 1398 ( 1922); 
See also annotation, People v. Cahan, 50 A.L.R. 2d 
583 § II. 
As the burden of establishing an irregularity in secur-
ring evidence sought to be used against the appellant is 
appellant's, it is clear in the instant matter such burden 
has not been met. State v. Pokini (supra) ; State v. 
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Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574, 52 ALR 454 
( 1926). The appellant must support the contention of 
illegal search at trial. It is not for the prosecution to lay 
a foundation for the admission of the evidence obtained 
by the search. United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 
519, 522 ( 1955). See also, State v. Conner, 59 Idaho 
695, 89 P.2d 197 (1939); State v. Green, 43 \Vash. 
2d. 102, 260 P.2d 343 (1953). 
Respondent recognizes an exception to the above 
requirements where the accused had no knowledge of 
the facts which would have enabled him to file a pre-
trial motion to suppress the questioned evidence. 
Go1iled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 65 L.Ed. 647, 
61 S. Ct. 261 (1921). 
However, such exception is not urged in the instant 
manner, nor is explanation tendered as to appellant's 
failure to challenge the admissibility of the evidence 
on Fourth Amendment grounds. In many juris-
dictions the general rule prevails that an objection 
to evidence as obtained by an unlawful search and 
seizure would not be timely where it is made the first 
time at trial and not raised by a pre-trial motion 
to return the property or suppress the evidence. State 
v. Spencer, 74 Idaho 173, 258 P.2d 1147 (1953); 
State v. Davidson (Supra); People v. Marxhausen, 204 
Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557, 3 ALR 1505 (1919); State 
t'. Davis, l Ohio St. 2d 28, 30 Ohio Ops 2d. 16, 203 
N.E. 2d 357 (1964); State v. Hochman, 2 Wis. 2d 
410, 86 N.W. 2d 446, 77 ALR 2d 784 (1957); 
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Potman v. State, 259 Wis. 234, 47 N.W. 2d 884 ( 1951). 
An explanation of this rule is found in People v. Heibel, 
305 Mich. 710, 9 N.W. 2d 826 (1943) in which the 
Michigan Supreme Court holds the trial court should 
not be required to stop during the course of the trial 
to determine a collateral is.sue as to the legality of the 
means by which the prosecution obtained its evidence. 
See also State v. Jackson, 336 lVIo. 1068, 83 S .. YV. 2d 
87, 103 A.L.R. 339 (1935). 
Notwithstanding arguments to the contrary by 
appellant, the noting of errors which may have de-
prived appellant of a fair trial, in the interest of 
justice, even in the absenceof objection, is rarely done 
and then done with caution and an awareness of the 
importance of timely and proper objections. State v. 
Smith, 16 Ut. 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965); State v. 
Tuttle, 16 Ut. 2d 288, 399 P.2d 580 (1965). 
The instant case assumes no such exceptional 
character and this court should consider appellant's ob-
jections to the introduction of the evidence as having 
been waived. The recent case of State v. Tuttle, 
(supra) , provides an interesting parallel to the instant 
case. This court in Tuttle states in part: 
"The practical exigencies of a trial render it 
imperative that the trial judge have the prerog-
ative of ruling upon questions of the admissi-
bility of the evidence and upon issues of fact 
incidental to that purpose. For this reason and 
because of his position of advantage to observe 
the demeanor of witnesses and other factors 
6 
bearing on credibility his ruling thereon should 
~ot be disturbed unless it clearly appears he was 
in error ... 
A further difficulty with the defendant's po-
sition is that there was no timely objection made 
to the evidence in question ... nor was there any 
indication of a contention that there had been 
an illegal search. Neither then, nor at the trial, 
was there any motion to suppress. On the con-
trary, during the trial the defendant's counsel 
in his questioning continually ref erred to these 
exhibits ... Fairness requires that if he disputed 
the competency of the evidence he should make 
his objection at the earliest opportunity . . . 
Inasmuch as he chose to conduct his examina-
tion upon the basis of this evidence, before he 
stated his objection to it he should be deemed 
to have waived any such objection. (Emphasis 
added.) 399 P.2d 580 at 582. 
The court then affirmed the conviction by finding 
consent to the search and on the above quoted grounds. 
Similarly, the appellant now before this court 
brings with him a record demonstrating (I) lack of 
pre-trial procedure to suppress the questioned evidence, 
(2) a failure to object to the admission of the evi-
dence on the grounds now urged an appeal, ( 3) ex-
tensive cross-examination of witnesses concerning the 
evidence without an inference of questioned acquisi-
tion by the police officials. Clearly appellant has waived 
his objection to this evidence and in so doing his stand-
ing before this court to so argue. 
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POINT II 
BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE IN-
STRUCTIONS AS GIVEN BY THE COURT 
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED ALL OBJEC-
TIONS TO THEM AND CANNOT BRING 
THE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE TI-I l S 
COURT FOR REVIEW. 
Appellant, in his brief, urges error in jury in-
struction No. 15 (Tr. 39) as wholly inadequate to ap-
prize the jury as to the elements of the crime of grand 
larceny. At the conclusion of the trial, the following 
dialogue took place between the trial court, the prose-
cuting attorney, .Mr. Lewis, and defense counsel, .Mr. 
Shepherd: 
The Court: Gentlemen, as you know, you are 
entitled to take your exceptions to my instruc-
tions to the jury in their presence but out of their 
hearing or you may stipulate that they may be 
taken after the jury retires. 
Mr. Lewis: We will stipulate that they may 
be taken after the jury retires. 
Mr. Shepherd: We will so stipulate, your 
honor. (Whereupon the jury retires at the hour 
of 5 :00 o'clock p.m.) 
The Court: Mr. Lewis, do you have any ex-
ceptions? 
Mr. Lewis: No, your Honor, the State has 
none. 
The Court: Mr. Shepherd? 
Mr. Shepherd: No exceptions, your honor. 
8 
Utah statutes provide that exceptions to instruc-
tions to the jury in criminal cases shall be taken and 
preserved as in civil cases. Utah Code Ann. § 77-37 -1 
( 1953) . Of course it is well established that parties 
have a right to make objections to instructions and 
preserve challenge to their accuracy. Hanks v. Chris-
teru;en, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960). 
In this jurisdiction it has been held that the pur-
pose of exceptions to instructions is to assist the trial 
court in giving correct instructions. State v. Valdez, 
19 Utah 2d 426, 432 P .2d 53 ( 1967) . Of course a 
failure to object to the jury instructions as given by 
the court waives consideration of the error now urged. 
If appellant felt he was prejudiced by the definition 
of the crime as set forth in the questioned instruction, 
a specific exception should have been taken and counsel 
for appellant should have assisted the court by sub-
mitting instructions. 
Instructions are not generally the subject of error 
because of indefiniteness, matter of form, or omissions 
or deficiencies or inaccuracies in expression, if the ob-
jections, omissions or deficiencies are not pointed out 
at the time they are given. 53 Am. Jur. Trial § 824 
(1945). 
This court should find that the questioned instruc-
tion is not before the court for review, and for the pur-
poses of this case take it as the law governing the case. 
53 Am. J ur. Trial § 844 ( 1945) . The cases of State v. 
Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936) and State v. 
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Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 (1937) are cited by 
appellant as an avoidance of the general rule. lfoth 
cases state narrow exceptions, and further in Cobo it 
is clear that the trial court had made a clerical error 
in instructing the jury as to the included offense of 
voluntary manslaughter in a first degree murder prose-
cution. This court in Cobo found the defective instrue-
tion, even absent an exception lodged, effectively de-
prived the defendant of his right to be convicted of a 
lesser included offense. 
In Waid, the trial court charged conflicting in-
structions as to the quantum of proof required to con-
vict. This court found, again absent timely exception, 
that the jury might well have found guilt by a prepon-
derance of the evidence and so reversed the conviction. 
Appellant would have this court find such substantial 
error in the questioned instruction as to fit within the 
Cobo-Waid exception. The major defect urged by the 
appellant is the failure to properly define "stealing 
was felonious." Commonly larceny is so defined. Larceny 
is defined in 32 Am. J ur. Larceny, § ( 1941) as: 
The felonious taking and carrying away by 
any person of the goods or things of another from 
any place ... 
Sir William Blackstone defined larceny as: "The 
felonious taking and carrying away of the goods of 
another," 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 230. The laws 
of the State of Utah define larceny as follows: 
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... the felonious stealing, taking, leading or 
driving away of the personal property of an-
other. Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-1 (1953); State 
v. Allred, 16 Ut. 2d 41, 395 P.2d 535 (1964). 
The instructions, therefore, did nothing more than 
<lefine the crime charged in terms which have developed 
specific historical and legal meaning. Persons of com-
mon intelligence and understanding would not be mis-
led in applying the questioned instruction to evidence 
as presented in the instant case when the instructions 
are viewed totally as they must be. Heywood v. Denver 
and R.G.W.R. Co., 6 Utah 2d 155, 307 P.2d 1045 
(1957); Badger v. Clayson, 18 Ut. 2d 329, 422 P.2d 
665 (1967). 
Putting aside the sufficiency or insufficiency of 
the instruction it remains clear that the appellant is not 
entitled to have this court pass upon the question of 
alleged error in instructing the jury for the reason that 
no objection was made or exception taken to the charge 
at the time it was given or before verdict. State v. 
T¥eaver, 78 Utah 55, 6 P.2d 167 (1931). 
It is further abundantly clear from the record that 
appellant's total contentions on appeal are matters 
raised for the first time before this court. It has been 
a long and well established principle of appellate pro-
cedure in this jurisdiction that such will not be allowed. 
In re El-dters Estate, 19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 
(1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 358, 431 P.2d 
358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967); Hamilton v. Salt Lake 
11 
County Sewage Improvement District, 15 Utah 2d 
216, 390 P.2d 235 (1964); Salt Lake City v. Perkin,is, 
9 Utah 2d 317, 343 P.2d l106 ( 1959) ; State v. Star-
light Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant would have this court suspend the opera-
tion of well established procedures and prohibitions to 
reach this court with unconvincing arguments. The 
waiver of defects complained of by appellant is tirmly 
established. The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully sbmitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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